Deliberately narrow: injection, authorization, secrets, unsafe deserialization. No style notes and no general-correctness comments, so a finding here means something. Runs beside code review rather than inside it, so a second model family sees the same diff.
- Triggerson
pull_request, or @wrokin audit
- Modelyours (BYOK) — often a different family to the reviewer
- Outputa comment naming
file:line with the fix
Sample output — a real finding on this repo — it was right
security-audit · real output
### 🤖 wrokin security audit
apps/wrokin-backend/src/services/posture/checks-toolchain.ts:365: The `matchesGlob`
function constructs a `RegExp` from user-controlled `.gitattributes` patterns
by mapping `*` to `[^/]*`. This is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of
Service (ReDoS) via catastrophic backtracking if a pattern contains multiple
wildcards (e.g., `*a*a*a*a*b`) and is matched against a long, non-matching
path. Remediation: use a non-backtracking glob library or implement a strict
limit on the number of wildcards allowed per pattern.
<sub>Model: google/gemini-3-flash-preview · your key, your model (BYOK)</sub>
—— measured after the report: 7 wildcards against a 60-char path took 29s.
Fixed by replacing the regex with a segment-wise matcher.